Asia Economics Blog

Co-authors:  Dora Xia and Hongyi Chen
 
Evaluating the stance of monetary policy for the open economies of East Asia requires a different approach than that developed for the US. In recent years, the discussion has centered around the concept of the neutral real interest rate, or r*. A commonly used definition of r* is the interest rate that prevails when economic slack is zero and inflation is stable. Observers then ask, by comparing r* with the existing policy rate, whether current monetary conditions are too accommodative or too restrictive.

The neutral rate of interest is inherently unobservable as it is a hypothetical concept. Consequently, it must be inferred through estimation. The semi-structural models designed to estimate r* for the US do not adequately capture the macroeconomic dynamics of East Asian economies. In particular, exchange rates and capital flows play a more significant role in East Asia, with spillovers from the US factoring in. Moreover, since the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-09, central banks have expanded their purview beyond the business cycle to give more attention to financial stability.

Japan has, for several decades, experienced a toxic combination of an aging and shrinking population, slow growth, and very large fiscal deficits and debt. Looking forward, Japan’s potential growth is expected to approach zero, in large part owing to its demographic profile (see IMF).

These interrelated issues have led policy-makers in Japan on a search for meaningful structural reforms to raise potential growth and offset the impact of eventual fiscal adjustment. One area that has received significant attention has been the Japanese  labor market, which is characterized by low female labor force participation; a significant duality between heavily-protected workers and “non-regular” workers with few protections and lower productivity; and limited flexibility regarding working conditions and modalities (Figure 1).

The western Pacific Ocean is not literally pacific—it is not peaceful. In the south, overlapping claims to rocky islets have led to clashes over oil and gas reserves and fishery resources between a half dozen countries. In the north, there are also conflicting claims to maritime features. Across the region low-level hostility is not uncommon.

Problems between Japan and South Korea are particularly thorny. Recently, before the current COVID-19 pandemic, tensions mounted, partly reflecting South Korean resentment over Japanese treatment of Korean women during World War II and Japanese reluctance to recognize this issue. Japanese claims to the South Korean administered island of Dokdo (Takeshima in Japanese) are a continuing touchstone inflaming the discussion.

With the August 28 announcement by Prime Minister Abe of his intention to step down from his position within weeks, his record in a number of areas will inevitably face scrutiny and evaluation. Here, I lay out, in brief, my views on his government’s macroeconomic policies, which quickly became known as Abenomics. Like most governments, his had both successes and missed opportunities. But Japan clearly has changed as a result of his economic policies. And the debate around Abenomics anticipated issues that remain highly relevant in the current global policy debate.

The context